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AN EXTENDED HYPOTHETICAL FOR
TEACHING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Charles H. Koch, Jr.*
Many law students begin Administrative Law disoriented in a ftmdamental
way and many go through the entire course without finding stable ground.
While most law students have been exposed to traditional lawyering since
infancy, they do not have a similar context upon which to study the
administrative process. In their other courses, they are given increasing doses
of a recognizable version oflegal practice until they feel comfortable with it.
They study administrative law with no such nurtured grounding. Indeed,
administrative law challenges many of the assumptions oftraditional AngloAmerican legal principles.
Such context is difficult to create artificially especially in a semester or,
when actually needed, in the beginning stages ofthe course. I have confronted
this absence of context with a "simulation" or extended hypothetical. I would
like to describe the goals and nature of this extended hypothetical. 1
I. GoALS

Administrative Law should be committed to the practical application of
administrative law. Administrative Law students should leave the course with
a foundation for engaging in an administrative practice.' Atleast, they should
be given as much basic practical understanding as any course can.
Confounding any effort to teach an "applied" course in Administrative
Law is the vast array of programs and administrative schemes. The classic
administrative law cases, for example, bounce the students from one
adnnnistrative scheme to another, each involving a heavy investment in

* Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law; BA. 1966,
University of Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1975,
University of Chicago. The author would like to thank the University of Louisville and
particularly Professor Russell Weaver for providing to forum for an exchange on teaching
Ad!ninistrative Law.
1
Sample "lessons" of the current version of the Hypothetical is included as Appendix A
and the fictitious statute to which many of the lessons refer is included as Appendix B,
reprinted with permission of Matthew Bender & Co., one of the LEXIS Publishing companies.
All rights reserved.
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understanding a complex substantive discipline. The students quickly lose
focus. They are not sure what they are to glean from these cases. Indeed,
we often talk about issues that were somewhat peripheral to the core
controversy.
How can we overcome this disorienting array of substantive controversy
in which administrative law issues are imbedded? I think administrative law
does so through a search for commonality. The practical application of
administrative law looks to strategies for sharing fundamental principles from
among various substantive programs. In some senses, this search for
commonality might have the feel of the search for "rules" in other courses.
Yet, the common ground developed in Administrative Law cannot be
characterized as "rules" to be applied in similar circumstances, but rather
systemic principles which are shared at the initial stage of confronting common
problems.
The hypothetical helps me demonstrate the transfer of evolved
understanding regarding several common administrative law problems. My
experience is that it replicates the actual practice of administrative law in that
one learns the established treatment of a question in one system to apply it to
a similar question in another system. For example, the law regarding the
treatment of the hearsay rule in disability cases may be used to answer a
hearsay question at the FTC.
In order to teach these common and transferable characteristics, I work
from two well-established categories of generalization. The first is the
traditional four procedural models: formal and informal adjudication and formal
and informal rulemaking. 2 The second is based on the common issues
confronting administrative processes.
It is, of course, no novelty to center the discussion of internal process on
categories derived from the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication
and the extent to which these tasks must be accomplished by a trial-like
procedure. Every system, in our legal culture and those others I have studied,
distinguishes the enterprise of making decisions focused on individual dispute
resolution and that of resolving broad, general questions. Constitutional and
statutory prescriptions, as well as the "common law" that has developed
around them, have grounded administrative law principles on the distinction
between rulemaking and adjudication. State and federal AP As are organized

2

See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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from this distinction. And sinceLondoner3 andBi-Metallic, 4 procedural due
process begins with this distinction.
The process for engaging in these two categories of decision making
ranges among various levels of procedural formality, from very formal to no
participatory rights. In our legal culture, formality equates with the methods of
trial so that one pole ofthis continuum rests on a trial-like model. Between this
pole and no participation are nearly an infinite mix of types of participation.
Procedural alternatives can be studied by describ.ing points along this
continuum, although these points are somewhat artificial. Interacting with the
distinction between adjudication and rulemaking, these points produce a frame
of reference for the study and transfer of understanding among administrative
decision making tasks.
Less often explicit in organizing either the teaching or practice of
administrative law is the generalized understanding developed for categories
of issues. Nonetheless, such generalizations help make administrative law
manageable. Diverse substantive programs confront common categories of
issues and some common principles cover decision making with respect to
those categories. The diverse substantive programs are brought together
through these categories and common questions can be explored so that
learning from among individual programs can be spread throughout the
administrative law system. The internal procedures, the nature of external
monitoring, and the very authority of the bureaucracy can be understood in
terms of these issue categories.
For example, the concept of review of the policy OSHA makes to
implement workplace safety programs. can help students to understand the
review of policy for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
The presumptions in favor of the Food and Drug Administration's expert
judgments as to technical facts may also be accorded to judgments oftechnical
facts made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 5 The process for finding
individual facts in declining state PUC electricity rate-making systems can
legitimize fact finding processes for emerging environmental permitting
3

Londoner v. City & Cotmty of Denver, 210 U.S. 378 (1908).
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
5
Agency regulations regarding matters specific to a particular agency are, of course,
frequently given deference by the judiciary because the agency is preswned to have particular
expertise. See Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ("[I]fthe statute is silent
or ambiguous wl.th respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a pennissib1e construction of the statute.").
4
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programs.
Unfortunately, resort to the generalizations created by these two strategies
casts an aura of artificiality. Because this approach is divorced from
substantive content, it engenders an image of highly stylized and conceptual
study. To a large extent, success in teaching Administrative Law hinges on
breathing a sense of reality into its generalities.

An attractive technique for doing so is to focus on a manageable set of
administrativeprograms. Thestudentsneedtoinformthemselvesaboutafew,
hopefully inherently interesting, substantive areas. The general principles
emerge within these programs and administrative law, external to the sample
programs, can be transferred into the context created by them. I find this to be
a useful pedagogical technique.
Over the years, however, I sought the advantage of focusing on one
administrative law program, especially designed for teaching Administrative
Law. No single existing program served this pedagogical purpose. Therefore,
I developed the hypothetical program described below along with characters
and scenarios designed to demonstrative administrative law principles.
II. DESIGNING TilE HYPOTIIETICAL SCENARIO
A. The Legislative Scheme
The hypothetical is grounded on a fictitious statute, "The Wine Trade
Commission Act,"6 designed to support discussions of various basic
administrative law issues. One of the reasons for this fictitious legislative
scheme is to provide statutory language as a springboard for discussion ofthe
cases and the general AP A. Thus, all but one section of the fictitious act
relates to process. Still, in order to assure some connec~on to reality, each of
these statutory provisions is based on provisions in existing legislation.
The legislative scheme provides only the most skeletal substantive law.
The basic strategy of building the extended hypothetical around a new and
nascent administrative scheme is to minimize the commitment to substantive
law. The absence of deep substantive background captures one of the major
advantages ofthis approach. The student need not invest a substantial amount
of energy in mastering even a single program. Necessary substantive law can
be developed through the hypothetical exercises. Student attention then is not
diverted by substantive issues other than those created by the hypothetical.

6

See Appendix B, infra.
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Similarly, the danger of passionate digression into social policy issues is
avoided by the choice of consumer protection in the wine industry. While many
of us enjoy wine, it does not create the emotional tension of other issues. Yet,
whileitdoesnotraisepassions,itis fun. In addition, the substantive "expertise"
problem is mitigated because many law faculty and students seem to know a
bit about wines, the basics are fairly simple, and brief forays into the industry
are interesting and straightforward. (Even those who object to alcohol should
not find concentration on theregulation of this industry too disagreeable and
no one to date has objected to the hypothetical on those grounds.)
A second pedagogical advantage is that students see, indeed participate in,
the development of substantive law for this particular agency and derive and
develop procedural law. Thus, the hypothetical develops an understanding of
how substantive law evolves through the administrative process. It forces the
students to participate in the law making and it demonstrates the interaction
among the various units within the agency. The students see both the
rulemaking and adjudicative processes presenting the agency with the need to
develop "agency law." It permits a discussion of the agency's relation with
other institutions, particularly the courts, in the development of the agency's
substantive law.
For this purpose, it replicates old-fashioned agencies rather than those
created since the 1970s. In the early stages of administrative law, agencies
were given a mission and trusted to find the best way to carry out that mission.
For example, Brandeis constructed the Federal Trade Commission with a very
broad mandate, "unfair method of competition," and intentionally left to the
FTC the task of giving that phrase meaning. 7 This model serves administrative
law teaching well. Therefore, my fictitious statute borrows from section 17 of
the Securities Act of 1933 for its major substantive provision. 8 This section
renders illegal practices described only as "any device ... to defraud" or the
omission of"material fact.'>9 It necessarily focuses attention on process, the
process carrying forward this broad mandate.
B. The Agency

The hypothetical revolves around the working of a fictitious agency, the
Wine Trade Commission. The basic structure of this legislative scheme is

7
8
9

See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41-77 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
15U.S.C.§77a(1933).
See id.

318

BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

modeled after the Federal Trade Commission. 10 As suggested above, the FTC
model also has the advantage ofbeing an agency of an older vintage for which
the legislation leaves the agency substantial scope to design procedures and
evolve its substantive law.
The wine agency is new and in its formative stage. This stage is generally
the most exciting moment in the life of an agency. Everyone is new and the
younger staff, with whom the students are likely to identify, often end up
helping their more senior colleagues understand ruling principles. Nothing is
settled and the students h~ve the opportunity to form the agency using the law
presented in the course. These circumstances are exciting to the students,
albeit fairly rare in actuality.
The agency is staffed with as many different types of individuals as
feasible. A practical lesson students can learn from this device is that agencies
(and governments in general) are communities offairly diverse individuals with
different backgrounds, training, social policy biases, and ambitions. Government
is generally presented as a monolith, unaffected by the individual personalities
working within it. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth, and both
those who will work in government and those who will engage in government
related practice are more effective if they learn to deal with the diversity. 11

C. Characters
The characters orient the students within the hypothetical. The students
are made to apply the general administrative law principles from a variety of
perspectives, both inside and outside the agency. All the characters are
composites of individuals I have known, most during my FTC staff days.
Many characters simulate those with whom the students can identify or
can expect to deal in the early stages of their administrative practice. When
law school focuses on legal practice, it does so many years in the students'
future. Even the most confident and ambitious student must see a tremendous
gap between, say, an appellate court perspective and their immediate future.

10

I worked for the Federal Trade Commission prior to becoming a professor. This
experience has left me very comfortable with the reality of the situations presented. I feel this
is a tremendous advantage and I encourage others to design the hypothetical agency around an
agency with which they are familiar.
11
.I fmd that a now somewhat dated video developed by the League ofWomen Voters, "The
Regulators," also helps give the students a sense of the realities of administrative operation. The
video tracks a rule through the internal EPA rulemaking process. For one thing, it demonstrates
the various tensions that affect the fmal regulatory design.
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In contrast, the hypothetical leads them to apply basic principles in the more
realistic context of very junior staff attorney or associate.
The two core characters are recent law graduates with whom the students
should be able to identify. Abby is anew associate, right out oflaw school, in
a major D. C.law firm. Ben is nearly as new, having moved from a prominent
clerkship onto the agency staff.
Abby will represent Gallery, a major wine producer. Of course, Ben
engages in actions against Gallery. These actions present judicial review and
rulemaking context along with basic law enforcement adjudication. Ben, and
less often Abby, must deal with various characters within the agency, other
staff, the bureau director, and, since he is a budding star, even the general
council and agency head. Abby, while less often engaged with the others
within the agency, represents private clients who raise questions that are not
easily presented in the context of the epic struggle between Gallery and the
Wine Commission.

D. Individual Lessom
The intended use of the materials is to form a running hypothetical. The
individual lessons are constructed to raise questions appropriate to the focus
of the particular class. 12 One advantage of an extended hypothetical is that
each individual problem is presented in an established context and to somewhat
fully formed characters.
The hypothetical lessons attempt to place the students in realistic situations
calling for the application of fundamental principles. Identifying with certain
characters also forces the students to see the questions from different levels.
To the extent possible, however, the hypothetical seeks to present
administrative law questions in a "street-level" context.
Design of the individual lessons enables the hypothetical to fit individual
teaching agendas. For me, the individual lessons are organized and designed
to cover those parts of my casebook I choose to cover. In fact, I continual! y
revise those lessons presented in my teacher's manual. Actual use might
convince me that a scenario needs revision to accomplish its purpose. Or an
examination question might suggest improvements in a particular lesson. I
would hope that others would modify the basic design to fit their own purposes.

12

Some sample lessons are included as Appendix A.
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Some of the lessons ask the students to apply the administrative law
principles in a state context. Most of us teach federal law, and in fact, even
state administrative law opinions are dominated by federal law. Nonetheless,
by forcing application of these principles in a state context, the hypothetical
reminds the students that they may actually confront an issue in their state
practice. It also permits a discussion of any contrasting state approach,
especially in the law school's state, without requiring materials particularized
for that purpose.
Ill. USING TilE HYPOTIIETICAL

The extended hypothetical need not be associated with a particular
teaching strategy. I have found that it easily accommodates, and can enhance,
all of the traditional approaches. Indeed, I have experimented with several
techniques to satisfy myselfthatthehypothetical could support other methods.
Obviously, the hypothetical is designed to support a problem solving
teaching technique. It forces the students to apply the learning from various
programs and systems presented by the casebook to solve a problem presented
by the hypothetical. That is, the student must actually use the tools of
administrative law: relevant legislation, the AP A and enabling act, and case
law as compiled and digested in the casebook.
The hypothetical could be used to support a case focused approach. For
example, in considering anondelegation case, one could shift to the fictitious
act, even without reference to a lesson, to delve further into the implications
of broad delegations. Application of the language in relevant cases to the
WTC's broad delegation might alert the students to the implications of that
doctrine. One might ask how the WTC will treat its delegation as informed by
an understanding of the nondelegation doctrine.
The fictitious act and hypothetical scenes also support lecture. Even
though I am committed to the dialogue style (generally "Socratic"), I find
occasion to lecture. Even here, however, I find myself referring to the
hypothetical scenes or the fictitious act. I can envision, ifl desired, using them
to aid a purely lecture approach.
IV. CONCLUSION

Simulated administrative practice through an extended hypothetical with
an enabling act and established characters solves several problems in teaching
Administrative Law. First, and perhaps most important, it prevents the subject
from drifting offinto theory and abstraction. Although administrative law relies
on broad generalization, the hypothetical demonstrates how general concepts
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might be used in practice situations. Second, in that regard, the hypothetical
develops the practical techniques for sharing learning among programs and
systems. Third, the hypothetical can demonstrate how the federal law that
dominates most of our teaching can be applied in state and local context.
Fourth, thehypotheticallocates the course on a level at which the student can
anticipate practicing. In sum, it furthers the overarching strategy of casting
Administrative Law as a course the student can and will use.
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Appendix A
THE SIMULATION
DAYS OF WINE AND REGULATION*
Simulation for
Koch, Administrative Law, 3d ed.

Abigail ("Abby, for heaven's sake") stood .at her mailbox in her
Washington, D. C. apartment building holding two letters. Ironically, she knew
the gist of both before she opened them The first was from her mother living
in the rural midwestern town where her father owns the hardware store. It
would have the same small farm-town gossip, different in only the minutest
detail from the gossip that preceded it. It would end with some maternal
daydream with vague references to a home and children. Her mother always
refers to her stay in Washington as if it were a vacation trip. The other letter
was as formal and terse as her mother's letter was rambling and chatty. It,
she knew, was a notice that she had passed the D.C. bar. She had read her
name in a list in the Washington Post that afternoon.
Abby has just joined a large Washington law firm, specializing in
government practice. She will assist with one of the firm's major clients,
Gallery. Gallery is a large wine producer. Abby will help represent Gallery
inrnattersrelatedtothenewWineTradeCommission(WTCorCommission).
Of particular concern at present is the prospect of law enforcement
proceedings against Gallery for alleged violations of the new wine act. Also
of interest is a recently issued rule tightly regulating the adding of sugar to
wines. Indeed, Abby spent most of the day in the WTC's general counsel's
office as part of the Gallery team discussing these matters.
At the meeting, Abby was introduced to Dan. The new Wine Merchants
Association (Association) hired Dan as its general counsel. His duties are
numerous, including monitoring WTC's regulatory activities affecting the wine
industry. Abby will work closely with Dan in the future.

• Reprinted by pennission. Copyright (1996) Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., one of the
LEXIS Publishing companies. All rights resexved.
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Dan sees their mutual nemesis on the Hill as Brit. Brit is chief of Senator
Bisby' s staff. She encouraged the Senator to push through the wine legislation
that established both the Association and the WTC. Both entities are to
regulate anti-consumer practices in the wine industry as well as promote that
industry. Brit has proven to be a particularly dogged skeptic regarding the
wine industry's practices.
At present, Abby hungered to celebrate her bar passage. She had called
her parents that afternoon and by now most of her home state had been
informed. But, here she knew no one as yet. After only a brief reflection, she
wheeled out of her apartment building and headed for a nearby bar. At least
she could toast herself before she went back to her apartment.
But she did not have to celebrate alone. At the bar was a man, whose
name she remembered is Ben, she had met that day at the offices of the Wine
Trade Commission (WTC). Her fear of celebrating alone suppressed her
reticence and she introduced herself to Ben. To her relief, Ben's face
brightened and he ordered her a drink.
Ben had recently joined the General Counsel's office of the newly formed
WTC after a clerkship for a judge on the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia He grew up, she quickly found out, in
a fancy northeastern suburb. His father had made a financial success of a
sole practice his father started over his parents' grocery store. Ben's mother
was an irrepressible public interest advocate. Together they gave him his
values and the best education in the world. It was natural then for him to take
ajobin a consumer protection agency despite offers from the top firms in the
country. While protecting wine consumers was not exactly poverty law, it
promised to be an entertaining venture in the defense ofthe public interest. As
his judge advised him at the time: "Working for a new or revitalizing agency
is the most fun in government." Already he found himself surprisingly
responsible for foundational decisions about enforcement strategy and methods
of proceeding.
That night Abby learned a good deal about the WTC, information that will
no doubt serve her well in the near future. Therefore, she listened more
carefully than she might have otherwise to Ben's playful description of the
major players at the WTC.
Carl is the WTC chair. He was recently defeated in a hotly contested
congressional race. The party rewarded his loyalty with a position at the
Department of Agriculture. When the WTC was created, he was appointed
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its chair. Although nominally a lawyer, his entire career has been in politics
and government.
The chair can rely on the two other commissioners from the President's
party. Ben thinks it appropriate that their names are Fred, lawyer from a state
bond firm in Sacramento, and Barney, a lawyer turned commercial real estate
developer from Denver, because of their Stone Age mentality. Ben believes
that the executive office can rely as well on the fourth commissioner, Sally.
Unlike the other commissioners, she is not a lawyer but an economist. The
oddball is Clara Even though a commissioner not in the President's party was
required by the wine act, Clara's views are more radically different than
expected. As one very lone truly independent memberofthe WTC, it seemed
she would be harmless if sometimes uncomfortably vocal.
Except for the chair, the commissioners will rarely have direct impact on
Ben's work. The officials of most interest for him are the General Counsel
and the Assistant General Counsel for Litigation. The greatest surprise to Ben
has been the quality of these two individuals.
Chris is the General Counsel. After law school, she began a phrenetic
career as a campaign manager and then administrative assistant to several
members of Congress. Then she took a job in the legal department of the
Health Care Finance Administration ofthe Department ofHealth and Human
Services in search of a predictable and manageable time commitment. She
was senior career lawyer in the legislative branch when Carl offered her the
General Counsel position. Ben finds Chris to be shrewd rather than brilliant.
He said he would not make jokes about her partly because he respects her
abilities and partly because "she knows everything said or done in this town."
The Assistant General Counsel is Ralph. Ralph had a reputation as a
brilliant criminal trial attorney before coming to the WTC. Although he took
the job as a change of pace, he attacked it with all his impressive energy. By
nature, he believes in the free market and hence he finds regulatory action
uncomfortable. Yet, Ben has found him open to argument and willing to
support a well reasoned and soundly prepared position even if not one he
would naturally advance himself Ben often contemplates the idea offollowing
Ralph to his firm when they both tire of government service.
From this admission, the conversation moves to their dreams ofthe future
and from that to even more trivial and forgettable tavern chatter until they
noticed the late hour. As it happens, their parallel careers would bring them
together constantly, often on the opposite sides of the WTC processes. [A
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complete character list is provided at the end of the simulation.]

*****
Lesson 2A.l. [Choice of procedures] Members of Congress who are
particularly interested in the wine act are beginning to openly criticize the WTC
for its lack of vigor. Carl wants to quiet this criticism from the "Hill" and
wants some action to show them. In order to add vigor to the WTC's
enforcement efforts, Carl asked Ben to head a special task force. Ben
determined that Gallery's labels promise its wines are made of a much higher
quality grape variety than is actually used in the wines. He finds that it also
failed to disclose additives that enhance the taste and shelf-life ofits wine. He
argues that consumers want to know this information. Noting that section 5
of the wine act makes it unlawful "to omit to state a material fact," Ben
suggests that this language would authorize the WTC to bring an enforcement
action against Gallery for failure to disclose its wine ingredients.
a.

What functions will the WTC need to perform here?

b. Ben then considers whether he should recommend that the WTC
promulgate a rule under section 8 before taking any enforcement action
.or instead immediately initiate a law enforcement adjudication under
section 7 against Gallery.
c.

What can be accomplished by a rule?

d. If it chooses an adjudication, what effect on subsequent enforcement
against other wine bottlers?
e.

What is the WTC's authority to choose?

*****
Lesson 2B.l. [Application of procedural due process] Abby is assigned the
case of one ofthe firm's clients, Sid. Sid owns a small, local liquor wholesale
operation in which he distributes wine along with other alcoholic beverages.
He is required by the WTCA to join the Wine Merchants Association in order
to continue carrying wine. Recently, the Association suspended Sid for
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violating pricing disclosure provisions ofits "Fair Marketing Practices" rules
promulgated under the language in section 6(d), authorizing the Association to
"regulate the conduct ofits members." The Association's adjudication board
issued the suspension after an abbreviated hearing. Abby would like to
challenge the procedural adequacy of the suspension. Can she demonstrative
the elements necessary to establish a procedural due process interest in
Association membership?

Lesson 2B.2. [Procedures required by due process] Abby is asked to
represent a friend's son, Nick, a second year law student at a state school.
Nick was denied a position on the Law Review. Selection for law review is
based on a "write-on" competition. Nick submitted his paper on the assigned
topic, but was not one of the students selected. When he was not selected, he
asked the editors for a written critique ofhis paper, but they refused to provide
any explanation for their decision. He then asked the faculty advisor to review
his case. The advisor met with Nick and the review's editor-in-chief. After
this conference, the advisor told Nickthathe saw no reason to "second-guess"
the editors. Nick then appealed to the law school dean. The dean refused to
consider his request. Nick hired Abby to challenge the editors' decision.
What additional procedures might Abby realistically demand in a due process
action and what arguments should she make for the alternative procedures?

Lesson 2C.l. [Procedures required by statute] Chris decided that the
WTC must develop procedures for promulgating rules. She asked Ralph to
review the statutory requirements and recommend procedures to carry out the
WTC's statutory mandate. Ralph was appalled at the informality of the
rulemaking procedures established by WTCA section 8. He then asked Ben
to draft rulemaking procedures.
a.

What procedures are required for making rules under the AP A? Does the
WTCA modify these requirements? Do these procedures satisfy due
process?

b. Does section 8(c) require trial-like procedures for wine merchant license
rules?
c.

What arguments might Ben make to satisfy Ralph about the adequacy of
these procedures?

d. Will the opportunity for judicial scrutiny ofWTC rules help satisfy Ralph
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about the fairness of its rulernaking procedures?
e.

Ben notices that section 6(d) authorizes the Association to make rules. He
wonders whether the APA rulemaking requirements apply to the
Associations rulernaking. Should the WTC nonetheless dictate procedures
to the Association?

*****
Lesson 4A.3. [Review of adjudication] Judge Fox is considering an appeal
from an WTC "cease and desist" order. The order resulted from an
enforcement hearing, initiated before the promulgation of the sugar rule,
charging Hill Wines, Inc. with adulterating its wine in direct violation ofWTCA
section 5. The WTC ALJ, Joe, found that the addition of sugar to the juice
naturally produced by the wine grapes did not constitute a practice in violation
of WTCA section 5, but that the failure to disclose additives, even sugar,
constituted an omission of a "material fact" which did violate the Act. Joe
found that the addition of sugar, ifneeded, was a general industry practice, and
that Hill's actions did not constitute fraud. He rejected, however, testimony
from Hill's expert that wine drinkers generally knew that sugar may be added
and that they did not care because they judged the wine by taste, not
ingredients. For that reason, his order required disclosure. Both Hill and the
WTC staff appealed the decision to the full Commission. The Commission,
after oral argument, agreed with Joe that the failure to disclose sugar additives
violated WTCA section 5. It also held, however, that the addition of sugar
constituted the employment of a "device, scheme or artifice to defraud," which
was not excused by industry practice. In the alternative, it disagreed with
Joe's conclusions with respect to the industry practice and stated that its
experience is that reputable wine producers do not add sugar to their wines.
Therefore, the Commission's order prohibited the addi.tion of sugar whether
disclosed or not. Hill appealed that order. On judicial appeal, Hill argued that
the order was not supported by "substantial evidence."
a

Is the substantial evidence standard the appropriate standard in this case?

b. What should Fox consider in applying the substantial evidence standard?
c.

Under this standard, should Fox review differently Hill's contention that
not only the WTC 's order, but also the more lenient ALJ order, should be
overturned because Joe erroneously rejected the testimony by its expert?
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d. Hill also urged that, even if the order is found to be supported by
substantial evidence, the WTC abused its discretion by its harsh sanctions
against Hill for practices Hill believed were merely matching competitors
and did not harm consumers even if technically in violation ofthe WTCA.
How should Fox review the exercise of "discretion" here?
e.

Assume instead Fox was considering appeal of a rule in which the WTC
said adding sugar must be disclosed. What would the standard of review
be and how would it differ from review in this case?

*****
Lesson 6B.l. [Rulemaking procedures] The WTC is considering
comprehensive labeling rules. Brit is contemplating a proposed rule which
would require disclosure of grape varieties for all wines, including the
percentage of each grape varieties used in the wine. The rule might also set
standards for designation of region of origin and vintage. It might even require
somehealthinformation on wine labels. Brit recognizes that the configurations
of the proposed rule are extremely important.

a

What kind of information should she ensure will appear in the notice of
proposed rulemaking?

b.

Abby wants to cross-examine the key staff expert. Is that required?
Wise?

c.

What information should Brit want in the record in order to consider such
a rule? How should she go about obtaining this information?

d. What use should she make ofinformationsubmitting by the wine industry?
By the consumer groups?
e.

What would Abby do to protect her client in this rulemaking?

f.

The law requires some effort to negotiate certain rules. Would the
labeling rule be a good candidate for negotiated rules? What will the WTC
gain by negotiating a labeling rule? How should Brit structure the
negotiated rulemaking process?

*****
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Lesson 6C.l. [Making a rule] After the completion of an extensive public
comment period, Brit's staff sends her a recommended final labeling rule. She
reviews the rule, the accompanying statement and the record. Her attention
is particularly drawn to the staffs efforts with respect to several specific
problems. The record shows that some wine producers add food coloring and
artificial chemicals to make low quality grapes look and taste like good wine.
Many add preservatives and some ofthese growers add antibacterial solutions
to meet local health standards. The staff recommends strict disclosure
requirements for additives. It suggests that even though the proposed rule
contained no provision regarding additives, the notice did suggest that the wrc
might consider disclosure of health information. It urges that this was
sufficient notice to justify the additive provision.
a.

How should she evaluate the content of the staffs draft rule and the
statement of basis and purpose?

b. What should lead her to send it back for more work?
c.

What would lead her to conclude that the record was adequate? Should it
contain a cost/benefit analysis?

d. One provision of the recommended final rule surprises Brit. The staff
concluded that the WTC made a mistake in not including additives in the
proposed rule. Should Brit approve this provision ofthe rule? What support
should she demand for an additive requirement? How could the statement
demonstrate that the additive requirement would be worthwhile?
e.

She notes that the staff expressed concern about the effect of the rule on
small, boutique vineyards. These are very marginal producers and the cost
of anew labeling regulation may put most ofthem out ofbusiness. Still, the
staff recommends broad application of the rule. Should Brit approve this
recommendation or suggest an alternative?

*****
Lesson 7B.l. [Allocation of decision making responsibility in the
adjudicatory hierarchy] Because the rulemaking is quiet, Dan is assigned a
case involving a contractor. The contractor's construction license has been
suspended by the state construction board after it found that the contractor
engaged in fraudulent practices. The construction standards are set by the
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state contractor board, whose members are private citizens engaged in
construction. Under the administrative procedures, he must appear before a
special ALJ. The ALJ is selected by the board's chair from the state ALJ
pool. At the hearing the contractor has an informal opportunity to state his
case, through counsel if desired. The findings of the ALJ are final, but an
ALJ's conclusion of law may be appealed to the board. The board has
designated its general counsel to hear these appeals. On appeal of the
suspension decision, Dan argues that his client did not have an impartial
hearing.
a.

How would he make that argument and how would the state counter the
argument?

b. How would Dan's argument be changed by the fact that the state has
adopted one ofthe model APAs?

*****
Lesson 7B.3. [Presenting an administrative case] As partofhis case, Ben
has Professor Peck testify regarding his conclusions about consumer
preferences based on information compiled by a task force commissioned by
the WTC. Neither Peck nor the task force conducted any of these studies
themselves. The professor states that the studies show that consUmers would
like to know about additives and grape varieties. As Peck begins to testify,
Abby objects. She notes that, while reliable hearsay is admissible in an
administrative hearing, this hearsay should not be admitted. She also urges that
under the circumstances she should have the opportunity to cross-examine the
employee.
a.

How should Joe rule?

b. If Joe allows the testimony, how should Abby counter this testimony?
c.

In anticipation of Abby's strategy, Ben asks Joe to take official notice of
the studies supporting the task force report. May Joe take official notice
of these studies? What procedures should he follow in doing so? How
should Abby respond?

*****
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Lesson 8A.2. [Bias and separation of functions] In her challenge to the
WTC's disclosure order against Gallery, Abby contends that the decision
violated the APA because of Joe's long service as a government lawyer.
Particularly, she is concerned that Joe was the FTC's staff attorney in a
consumer protection investigation of the wine industry's labeling practices.
One of the firms investigated was Gallery. She understands that the staff
recommended that a complaint be issued against the largest members of the
wine industry, surely including Gallery, but a change in administration aborted
the investigation. Can Abby make a case that Joe's presiding in this case
violates the doctrine of separation of functions? Should she be allowed
discovery to liDcover information that might lead to a petition to disqualify for
bias?

*****
Lesson 8C. [Ethics in government] Ben has a major personal decision to
make. Ralph has decided to quit and return to his law firm. He has asked Ben
to join him. The money is substantial and the firm is extremely prestigious.
The firm has a major wine producer as a client and it wants Ralph and Ben to
serve that client. Should Ben and Ralph be permitted to represent clients in
WTC related actions? Both wonder how much the Ethics in Government Act
and the Rules ofProfessional Conduct will interfere with any practice before
theWTC.

*****
Lesson 9A.1. [Use of personal information compiled by the government]
A powerful friend of Ben's family has offered to nominate his father to the
state Supreme Court. His father knows this will involve a close scrutiny ofhis
personal life, both present and past. Although he has been an exemplary
citizen throughout his life, he had a number of confrontations with federal
authorities during his student days. No formal action was ever initiated against
him but he wonders what the files in several agencies might contain about him.
He asks Ben several questions about these files. Under what law might a
newspaper obtain access to these files? Can a state investigative authority
obtain access to the files? Can Ben's father obtain access to these files
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himself? If he finds unacceptable information in them, can he have that
information removed or otherwise challenge it?

*****
Lesson 9B.2. [Exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act] Gallery is
concerned that information contained in the annual reports submitted to the
WTC under section 6(e) of the wine act might be available under the FOIA.
It asks Abby to find some protection for them. The particular information is:
(a)Any information concerning the content of the Gallery's wines.
(b)The WTC scientists' assay of the wine content.
(c)lnformation about future plans for the production of new wine.
(d)Marketing plans for last year's advertising programs.
(e)An exchange ofletters between Gallery and its accounting firm that is
attached to the annual report.
(f)Personalletter written by Gallery's CEO discussing the questionable
behavior of Gallery's staff at a retirement party.
Abby wonders whether the agency can protect the information Gallery
submitted under the FOIA.

CHARACTER LIST

Major players:
Abby -Begins as a lawyer with the D. C. office of a major New York law
firm and represents Gallery, a national wine bottler, and other clients of the
firm. Later, she becomes general cmmsel for the "Wine Merchants
Association."

Association- The Wine Merchants Association, a self-regulatory organization
created by the wine act and supervised by the WTC.
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Ben - A lawyer with the WTC who works his way up the agency ladder.

Brit - She begins as chief of Senator Bisby' s staff. She is later appointed from
Senator Bisby's office as head of the WTC's rulemaking division.

Carl- The first chair of the WTC. He was given that position because of his
political loyalties and not his talents.

Chris - She begins the simulation as WTC's General Counsel and later
becomes WTC chair. Her appointments are the result ofboth connections and
talent.

Dan- He is hired by the Association to represent it in legislative and regulatory
affairs.

Gallery - A large national wine bottler that has trouble with the WTC.

Joe - Former Federal Trade Commission trial attorney who is now an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the WTC.

Ralph- A talented criminal lawyer who takes some time from private practice
to take a position as the WTC's Assistant General Counsel for Litigation and
then returns to private practice.

The Wrath for Grape- A public interest group specializing in anti-alcohol
issues.

Minor players:

Barney - A commissioner who was a commercial real estate developer from
Denver.
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Bisby- The senator who sponsored of the Wine Trade Commission Act and
the legislator most likely to prod the WTC to action.

Clara - A commissioner with a reputation for strong-willed consumer
advocacy.

Ernie - An attorney in the WTC's regional office, often engaged in
enforcement activities.

Fox- Court of Appeals Judge.

Fred- A commissioner who was a lawyer who specializes in state bond issues
from Sacramento.

Hill Wines, Inc. - A particularly shady wine bottler owned by Harlan Hill.

Nick -A second year law student challenging a decision made by the editorial
board of his school's law review not to make him a member of the review.

Professor Peck - Consumer behavior expert.

Sally - Former economics professor who serves as one of the WTC
commissioners.

Sid- A client of Abby's.firm who owns a local liquor wholesale operation.
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Appendix B
SAMPLE ENABLING ACT'*

W aming. The followingfictitious enabling act is not law. It is intended
as a tool to facilitate discussion. Its sections are derived from sections in
actual legislation as described in the "Historical Notes."

WINE TRADE COMMISSION ACT
[fictitious]

Sec. 1
Enactment
Sec. 2
Definitions
Sec. 3
Development of American Wine Industry
Sec.4
Emergency Trust Fund
Sec. 5
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
Sec. 6
Licensing of Wine Merchants
Sec. 7
Orders

**

Reprinted by pennission. Copyright (1996) Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., one of the
LEXIS Publishing companies. All rights reseiVed.
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Sec. 8
Rules
Sec. 9
Judicial Review
Sec. 10
Enforcement
Sec. 11
Administrative Penalties
Sec. 12
Citizen Suits
Sec. 13
Separability

Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that an independent
agency is hereby created and established to be known as the Wine Trade
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) which shall be headed
by a chair and four other commissioners who shall be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than three
commissioners shall be ofthe same political party. The Commissioners shall
serve for seven years but may be removed by the President for inefficiency,
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. The Commissioners shall have
authority to employ and fix the compensation of such attorneys, special
experts, clerks and other employees as they may find necessary for the proper
performance of their duties and as appropriated by Congress. With the
exception ofthe Commissioners, attorneys and special experts, all employees
of the Commission shall be part of the classified civil service and shall enter
the service under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Commission and by the Office of Personnel Management. The Federal
Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-212, is amended to remove all
references to wine. The Secretary of Treasury shall hereafter have no
jurisdiction over the wine industry.
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Historical Note
This section was derived from the enactment clause of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
Sec. 2 Definitions.
(a) Association. The Association is the Wine Merchants Association
constituted 1IDder this Act.

(b) Commission. The Commission is the Wine Trade Commission
(WTC).
(c) Commissioners. The Commissioners are the five members of the
Commission who will administer the agency, issue rules and decide all cases.
They shall be presided over by one of the members who shall chair the
meetings.
(d) Rule. A rule is any statement ofgeneral applicability, having the force
oflaw, promulgated 1IDder the authority of this Act.
(e) Wine. Wine includes any alcoholic drinkmadefromafermentedfruit
unless otherwise defined by the Commission.

(f) Wine merchants. Wine merchants are all growers, wholesalers and
dealers in wine as defined by the Commission.

Sec. 3 A Plan for Development ofAmerican Wine Industry.
The Commission shall promptly initiate and carry out a program for the
promotion and development ofthe American wine industry. This program shall
include development grants from such funds as Congress appropriates for that
purpose. The Commission is authorized and directed to prepare a
comprehensive plan for the conduct of the development programs. The
Commission shall transmit such comprehensive plan to the President and to
each House of the Congress within 120 days of the establishment of the
Administration.

Historical Note
This section was derived from the Solar Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration Act of 1974, 42 US. C.§§ 5503 & 5564.
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Sec. 4 Emergency Trust Fund
(a) Creation of trust fund. The Commission shall set and collect an
annual fee from licensees under sec. 6. This fee will be allocated to a Trust
Fund and the Trust Fund will be used to insure individual growers against crop
failure or other natural disasters. The Trust Fund will be administered by the
Commission in cooperation with the individual states.
(b) Disaster relief In the case of any individual, the determination of
whether or not he suffered a disaster covered by subsection (a) ofthis section
and ofthe day such disaster began, and the determination ofthe day on which
such disaster ceases, shall be made by a State agency pursuant to an
agreement entered into under subsection (c) of this section. Except as
provided in subsections (d) and (e) ofthis section, any such determination shall
be the determination of the Commission for purposes of this Act.
(c) Federal/state cooperation. The Commission shall enter into an
agreement with each State which is willing to make such an agreement under
which any appropriate State agency or agencies will make the determinations
referred to in subsection (a) of this section with respect to all individuals in
such State, or with respect to such class or classes of individuals in the State
as may be designated in the agreement at the State's request.
(d) Commission review of state determinations. The Commission may
on its own motion review a determination, made by a State agency pursuant
to an agreement under' this section, that an individual is under a disaster and,
as a result of such review, may determine that such individual is not under a
disaster or that such disaster began on a day later than that determined by such
agency, or that such disaster ceased on a day earlier than that determined by
such agency.
(e) Hearing. Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under
subsection (b) or (d) ofthis section shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the
Commission or its delegatee.

(f) Payment to the states. (l)Each State which has an agreement with
the Commission under this section shall be entitled to receive from the Trust
Funds, in advance or by way of reimbursement, as may be mutually agreed
upon, the cost to the State of carrying out the agreement under this section.
The Commission shall from time to time certify such amount as is necessary
for this purpose to the Managing Trustee, reduced or increased, as the case
may be, by any sum (for which adjustment hereunder has not previously been
made) by which the amount certified for any prior period was greater or less

1999-2000]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

339

than the amount which should have been paid to the Stateunderthis subsection
for such period; and the Managing Trustee, prior to audit or settlement by the
General Accounting Office, shall make payment from the Trust Funds.
(2) Limits on use of funds. If a state objects to the Commission's
determination, it may request that the Commission reconsider that
determination. Upon such a request, the Commission shall reconsider its
determination under the procedures set out in 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583.
Notwithstanding 5 U.S. C.§ 581, all determinations oftheCommission under
this section shall be final.

Historical Note
Subsection (a) of this section is new.
Subsections (b) to (f) of this section are derived from the Social
Security programs disability provision, 42 US.C. § 421. Subsection
(/)(2) is new law.

Sec. 5 Employment ofManipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall beunlawfulforanyperson, directly or indirectly, bytheuseofany
means or instrumentality ofinterstate commerce, or ofthe mail, in connection
with the purchase or sale of wine:

(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Historical Note
This section was derived from section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 us.c. § 77q.
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Sec. 6 Licensing Wine Merchants.
(a) License required. It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a wine
merchant in interstate commerce unless such person has first obtained a "wine
merchants" license from the Commission.

(b) License application. A person may obtain a license as a wine
merchant by filing with the Commission an application as prescribed by the
Commission. A wine merchant license shall be granted if the applicant
complies with rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in
accordance with section 8(c) of this act.
(c) Suspension and revocation of a license. The Commission may by
order, after the opportunity for a hearing as prescribed by the Commission,
suspend or revoke any license for violation of this act or the rules of the
Commission promulgated in accordance with section 8 of this act.
(d) Wine Merchants Association. The Commission shall cause a private
association of wine merchants to be formed known as the ''Wine Merchants
Association." The Association shall regulate the conduct ofits members. The
Association may make rules and these rules shall be binding on its members
after review by the Commission. It shall be unlawful ·ror any person to sell
wine other than at retail unless that person is a member in good standing ofthe
Association.
(e) Required reports. The Commission may require any member of the
Association to submit such reports as it deems necessary to carry out the
purpose ofthis Act. Any person required to file a special report, who shall fail
so to do within the time fixed by the Commission for filing the same and such
failure shall continue for thirty days after notice of such default, shall forfeit to
the United States the sum of$1 000 for each and every day ofthe continuance
of such failure which forfeiture shall be payable into the Treasury of the
United States, and shall be recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the United
States brought in the district where the person resides or, if a corporation,
where it has its principal office or in any district in which it does business. It
shall be the duty of the various United States attorneys, under the direction of
the Attorney General of the United States, to prosecute for the recovery of
forfeitures. The costs and expenses of such prosecution shall be paid out of
the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of the United States.

(f) Release ofinformation. In accordance with its rules and regulations,
the Commission may release information obtained under this section if such
release will further the Commission's law enforcement purpose. Any officer
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or employee of the Commission who shall make public any information
obtained by the Commission without its authority, unless directed by a court,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Historical Note
Subsections (a) to (d) of this section are derived from section 15 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC. § 78o. Subsections
(e) and (f) are derivedfrom section 10 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 USC.§ 50.

Sec. 7 Orders.
(a) ( 1) Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that a person is
violating this Act, it shall issue and serve upon the person a complaint stating
its charges in that respect. After a full hearing, the Commission may issue
such orders as it finds necessary to cure the violation. The Commission shall
provide for appeal of any initial decision of a violation of this Act.
(2) Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that any person may
be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or
information relevant to a violation of this Act, it may, before commencement
of an enforcement action under this section, issue in writing and cause to be
served on such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person(A) to produce such documentary material for inspection and copying,
(B) to answer in writing written interrogatories with respect to such
documentary materials or information,
(C) to give oral testimony concerning such documentary material or
information, or
(D) to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.
(b) (I) An order conferring a development grant may be issued after a
general notice that the grant is available and an opportunity to submit written
application. A person denied a grant may appeal that decision to the
Commission. A person challenging a denial shall be afforded a conference
with the Commission or its delegatee. The conference shall include rights of
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parties to have reasonable notice, to appear in person or by counsel or other
qualified representative for the informal presentation of factual data, argument,
or proof, to have notice of any contrary facts or information in the possession
of the agency upon which it may rely in any way in making an adverse
decision, to receive prompt decision and to be informed, briefly and generally
in writing, of the factual or procedural basis for an adverse dec~sion.
(2) In order to assure compliance with the conditions of a grant, the
Commission or its delegatee may enter the premise of the grant holder.

Historical Note
Subsection (a)(1) of this section is derived.from subsection 5(b) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 US.C. § 45.
Subsection (a)(2) is derived.from the False Claims Act, 31 US.C. §
3733.
Subsection (b)(1) of this section is suggested by the 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act,§ 4-401.

Sec. 8 Rules
(a) General Rulemalcing Authority. The Commission shall have the
power to make ru1es and regu1ations for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this Act.
(b) Procedures for ru/emalcing. (1) The Commission shall initiate all
such rulemaking with aN otice of Proposed Ru1emaking. The notice shall be
published in the Federal Register. In addition to publication, the Commission
shall assure that all interested persons have actual notice of the proposed
rulemaking.
(2) In addition to seeking information by other methods, the Commission
before publication ofthe notice shall solicit comments from interested members
of the public on the subject matter of the possible rulemaking under
consideration.
(3) Prior to publishing proposed rules. in the Federal Register, the
Commission shall consider whether the rule is appropriate for negotiated
rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. §§ 561 et seq. The Commission may, within its
discretion, determine to undertake negotiated rulemaking.
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(4) The Commission shall issue a Regulatory Analysis with the proposed
rule. The Regulatory Analysis shall estimate the costs and benefits of the
proposed rule and compare those.costs and benefits with the costs and benefits
of alternative courses of action.
(5) Except as provided in subsection (c), the Commission shall promulgate
public participation guidelines for soliciting the input ofinterested parties in the
formation and development of its rules. These guidelines shall set out any
methods for identification and notification ofinterested persons and 1he method
whereby interested persons may participate in the issuance of the rule. The
guidelines shall set out the circumstances in which the Commission will
establish and consult with an advisory panels.
{6) The Commission shall publish the final rule in the Federal Register.
The final rule shall be acc·ompanied by a Statement of Basis and Purpose, in
compliance with 5 U.S. C. § 553(c), based on the rulemaking record.
(7)AnypersonmaypetitiontheCommissionforanexemptionfromafinal
rule. After the opportunity for a hearing, the Commission shall determine
whether to grant or deny an exemption.
{8)Theseprocedures are inapplicable to aruleconcem.ingonly1heintemal
management of an agency which does not directly and substantially affect the
procedural or substantive rights or duties of any segment of the public.
(c) Rules regarding wine merchant license. After the opportunity for
a full hearing, the Commission shall promulgate rules pertaining to eligibility for
a wine merchant license. Such rule shall be based only on substantial evidence
of record at such hearing and shall set forth, as part of the rule, detailed
findings of fact on which the order is based.

Historical Note
Subsection (a)(1) of this section is derived from subsection 6(g) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 US.C. 46(g). Subsection (b) combines
§§ 3-101, 3-105 & 3-116 of the 1981 MSAPA and§ 9-6.14:7.1 of the
Virginia Administrative Process Act. Subsection (c) contains language
from the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 US.C. § 371(e)(3).
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Sec. 9 Judicial Review.
(a) Petition for review of an order. (1) Any person who is subject to
an order issued under this Act may petition for review of the order in the court
of appeals of the United States, within any circuit where the act or practice in
question was used or where such person resides or carries on business, by
filing in the court, within sixty days from the date of the service of such order,
a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be set aside.
(2) Upon such filing of the petition the court shall have jurisdiction of the
proceeding and of the question determined therein concurrently with the
Commission until the filing of the record and shall have power to make and
enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the
Commission, and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed,
and to issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its
judgment to prevent injury to the public or to competitors pendente lite.
(3) The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive.
( 4) To the extent that the order of the Commission is affirmed, the court
shall thereupon issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of
such order of the Commission.
(5) The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the
same shall be subjected to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari, as
provided in section 240 of the Judicial Code.
( 6) Final order. An order of the Commission shall become final(i) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review,
if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, but the Commission
may thereafter modify or set aside its order;
(ii) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for
certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed, or the petition for
review dismissed by the court of appeals, and no petition for certiorari has
been duly filed; or
(iii) Upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, if the order of the
Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review dismissed by the
court of appeals; or
(iv) Upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance of the
mandate of the Supreme Court, if such Court directs that the order of the
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Commission be affirmed or the petition for review dismissed.
(b) Petition for review ofan administrative penalty. Any person against
whom a civil penalty is assessed in accordance with section 11 or who
commented on a proposed assessment may obtain review of a determination
to assess or refuse to assess such civil penalties lDlder that section. Any wine
consumer shall be deemed to have had a nonspeculative injury from such
determination.
(c) Petition for review of a rule. (1) Not later than 60 days after a rule
is promulgated under section 8 by the Commission, any interested person may
file a petition, in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia circuit or for the circuit in which such person resides or has a
principal place ofbusiness, for judicial review ofthe rule. Copies ofthe petition
shall: be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commission or
other officer designated for that purpose. The provision of section 2112 of
Title 28 shall apply to the filing of the rulemaking record of proceedings on
which the Commission based its rule and to the transfer of proceedings in the
courts of appeals.
(2) For purpose of this section, the term "rulemaking record" means the
rule, its statement of basis and purpose, the transcript of any oral hearing, if
any, any written submissions, and any other information which the Commission
considers relevant to such rule.
(3) Upon the filing ofthe petition \Dlder paragraph (b)(I) ofthis subsection,
the court shall have jurisdiction to review the rule in accordance with chapter
7 ofTitle 5 and to grant appropriate relief, including interim relief, as provided
by such chapter. The court shall hold unlawful and set aside the rule on any
gro\Dld specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section 706(2) of
Title 5 (taking into acco\Dlt the rules of prejudicial error), or ifthe findings of
fact upon which the rule is based are not supported by substantial evidence.
Neither the content and adequacy of the Regulatory Impact Statement
required by subsection 8(b)(4)northe content and adequacy of the Statement
ofBasis and Purpose required by subsection 8(b)(6) shall be subject to judicial
review in any respect.

Historical Note
Section (a) follows closely the classic "petition for review" provision
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S. C. § 45. Section
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(b) contains language from the judicial review provision of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 US.C. § 1319(g). Section (c) is derived
from the judicial review provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1975 amendments to the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 US.C. § 57a(e).

Sec. 10 Enforcement
(a) Civil penalty for violation of an order. Any person who violates
an order of the Commission to cease and desist after it has become final, and
while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil
penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the
United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the United
States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense,
except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect to
obey a final order of the Commission each day of continuance of such failure
or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense.
(b) Injunction. Whenever the Commission has reason to believe(I) that any person is engaged in a practice in violation of this act or a
rule, promulgated under section 8 of this act;
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the
Commission under section 5, and until such complaint is dismissed by the
Commission or set aside by the court on review, or the order of the
Commission to cease and desist made thereon has become final within the
meaning of section 5, would be to the interest ofthe public,
the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may
bring suit in a district court of the United States or in the United States court
of any Territory, to enjoin the practice upon proper showing a temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. Any such suit
shall be brought in the district in which such person, resides or transacts
business.
(c) Criminal penalty. Any person who willfully violates any provision of
this Act, or rules promulgated under section 8 ofthis Act shall upon conviction
be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
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Historical Note
Subsection (a) of this section is derived from subsection (/) of section
5 ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 US.C. 45(1).
Subsection (b) of this section is derived from an amendment to the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 US.C. § 53(b).
Subsection (c) of this section is derived from section 32 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 US. C. 78.ff(a).

Sec. 11 Administrative penalties
(a) Violation. (I) Whenever on the basis of any information available,
the Commission finds that a wine merchant as defined by section 2 has
violated this act, either may, after consultation with the State in which the
violation occurs, assess a civil penalty.
(2) In determining the amount of any penalty, the Commission shall take
into account the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation, or
violations, and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of
such violations, the degree of culpability, economic benefit or savings (if any)
resulting from the violation, and such other matters as justice may require.
(b) Hearing. Before issuing an order assessing a civil penalty, the
Commission shall give to the person to be assessed such penalty written notice
and the opportunity to request, within 30 days ofthe date the notice is received
by such person, a hearing on the proposed order. Such hearing shall not be
subject to section 554 or 556 or Title 5, but shall provide a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
(c) Rights of interested persons. (I) Before issuing an order assessing
a civil penalty, the Commission shall provide public notice of and reasonable
opportunity to comment on the proposed issuance of such order.
(2) Any person who comments on a proposed assessment of a penalty
shall be given notice of any hearing held under this section and of the order
assessing such penalty. In any hearing held, such person shall have a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
(3) If no hearing is held before issuance of an order assessing a penalty,
any person who commented on the proposed assessment may petition, within
30 days after the issuance of such order, for such hearing, the Commission
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shall immediately set aside such order and provide a hearing in accordance
with section (b). If the Commission denies a hearing, it shall provide to the
petitioner and publish in the Federal Register notice of and the reasons for such
denial.
(d) Finality of the order. An order shall become final30 days after its
issuance unless a petition for judicial review is filed or a hearing requested. If
such a hearing is denied, such order shall become final 30 days after such
denial.
(e) C o/lection. If any person fails to pay an assessment of a civil penalty
(I) after the order making the assessment has become final, or
(2) after a court in an action brought under subsection 9(b) has entered
a final judgment in favor of the Commission or Association,
the Commission shall request the Attorney General to bring a civil action in an
appropriate district court to recover the amount assessed (plus interest at
currently prevailing rates from the date of the final order). In such an action,
the validity, amount, and appropriateness of such penalty shall not be subject
to review.

Historical Notes
This section is derived from subsection 309(g) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U S. C. § 1319(g).

Sec. 12 Citizen suits
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction. Except as provided in
subsection (b) ofthis section, any person may commence a civil action on their
own behalf
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation
of (A) a Commission rule or (B) an order issued by the Commission.
(2) against the Commission where there is alleged a failure of the
Commission to perform any act or duty under this act which is not
discretionary with the Commission.
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The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such rule or order, or
to order the Commission to perform such act or duty, as the case may be.
(b) Notice. No action may be commenced
(1) under subsection (a)(l) ofthis section

(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiffhas given notice of the violation (i)
to the Commission, (ii) to the State in which the violation occurs, and (iii)
to any alleged violator of the rule or order, or
(B) if the Commission or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to
require compliance with the rule or order, but in any such action in a court
of the United States any person may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to 60 days after the
plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Commission;
Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Commission
shall prescribe by rule.
(c) Intervention by the Commission. In such action under this section,
the Commission, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(d) Award of costs. The court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may order any party, other
than the government, to pay the costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees), whenever the court determines that the
award of such costs is appropriate. The court may order the government,
when it is a party, to pay such costs to a prevailing party unless the court finds
that the position of the government was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
(e) Nonrestriction of other rights. Nothing in this section shall restrict
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute
or common law. Nothing in this section or in any other law of the United
States shall be construed to prohibit, exclude, or restrict any State, local, or
interstate authority from
(I) bringing any enforcement action or obtaining any judicial remedy or
sanction in any State or local court, or
(2) bringing any administrative enforcement action or obtaining any
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administrative remedy or sanction in any Sate or local administrative
agency, department or instrumentality,
against the United States, any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
or any officer, agency, or employee thereof under State or local law.

Historical Note
This section is derived from section 304 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U S.
C. § 7604. Some of the language in the second sentence of subsection (d)
comes from the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U S. C. § 504.

Sec. 13 Separability of Provisions
If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to any other person, or circumstance, shall not be affected
thereby.

